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In the light of the current economic, bank-
ing and public debt crises, many European 
countries are rethinking the funding of pub-
lic services. Taxes are usually the main source 
of income to finance publicly provided 
goods and services. Thus, tax compliance di-
rectly impacts a country’s ability to provide 
public goods, such as roads, schools, public 
health services and administration.
This paper contributes to this debate by sur-
veying the existing literature on tax com-
pliance, with a focus on the insights from 
behavioural economics. It also draws first 
pol icy conclusions and provides a research 
agenda in the field of behavioural econom-
ics with the objective of an improved un-
derstanding of the driving factors behind 
tax compliance. The current research sug-
gests that policy makers should consider 
behavioural economic policies in practice, 
for example, the potential of moral suasion 
in high-compliant countries, the use of the 
probability perceptions of tax payers (e.g., 
when taking part in lotteries), or ensuring 
that taxes serve a public benefit and that tax 
payers are aware of this fact. Policy makers 
should at the same time also remember that 
behavioural economic policies have to be 
used cautiously, for example due to differ-
ences in culture. Furthermore, current re-
search needs to be extended to gain more 
insights into the interplay of cultural or 
social norms and tax compliance, effects of 
behavioural economic policies when com- 
 
 
 
 
pliance levels are already low, and network 
and feedback effects of audits. Finally, more 
field experiments are necessary to be able to 
extrapolate findings observed in laborato-
ries into practice. We hope that this survey 
can be a first step towards addressing such 
research and policy agendas.
To systematically approach the field of tax 
compliance, it may be useful to define the 
term. However, there is no common defini-
tion of what precisely is compliant behav-
iour. Typically, tax compliance is rather de-
fined simply as the absence of tax evasion. 
Tax evasion again has to be differentiated 
from tax avoidance. The OECD defines 
the term tax evasion as ‘illegal arrangements 
where liability to tax is hidden or ignored’. 
This contrasts tax avoidance, which is de-
scribed as an ‘arrangement of a taxpayer’s 
affairs that is intended to reduce his liability 
and that although the arrangement could 
be strictly legal it is usually in contradiction 
with the intent of the law it purports to 
follow’.1 Similarly, Sandmo (2005, p. 645) de-
fines: ‘Tax evasion is a violation of the law: 
When the taxpayer refrains from reporting 
income from labour or capital which is in 
principle taxable, he engages in an illegal ac-
tivity that makes him liable to administrative 
or legal action from the authorities.’ Hence, 
 
1. The definitions are taken from the OECD Centre for Tax Pol-
icy and Administration’s Glossary of Tax Terms. Available at: http://
www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm.
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tax evasion is illegal, while tax avoidance is 
(strictly speaking) legal and would therefore 
be considered as tax compliance. Although 
this formal definition makes it straightforward 
to distinguish compliance from non-compli-
ance, moral judgement might also evalu ate 
tax avoidance as inappropriate–potentially 
even more than some cases of non-compli-
ance. Hence, behavioural economic policies 
targeting this moral element may also have 
a positive impact on tax payments beyond 
the merely legal reams of tax evasion.
As tax evasion is illegal activity, estimating 
its precise magnitude poses difficulties; how-
ever, some attempts to do so exist. The UK’s 
HM Revenue & Customs provides every 
year an estimation of the UK tax gap.2 The 
tax gap is defined as the difference between 
the estimated theoretical tax liabilities and the 
actual tax revenue. Figure 1 shows a recent 
estimation for the years 2010 to 2011. The to-
tal net tax gap accounts to about EUR 37 
billion (GBP 32 billion, around 2% of GDP) 
which compares to 6.7% of the estimated 
theoretical tax revenue. Losses from income 
tax, national insurance contribution and 
capital gains tax, as well as losses from the 
value added tax are with 45% and 30% re-
spectively, the two largest components (HM 
Revenue & Customs 2012, p. 7). Losses from 
tax evasion are estimated to EUR 4.6 bil-
lion (GBP 4 billion, around 0.3% of GDP) 
and losses from avoidance to EUR 5.8 bil-
lion (GBP 5 billion, around 0.4% of GDP). 
2. Here the UK serves as an example because from the EU28
 
coun tries Denmark and the UK are the only Member States that
 
publish estimates of the tax gaps on a periodic basis. Other reliable 
data on the tax gap is currently not available.
Other factors that expand the tax gap are for 
example errors, non-payment, differing le-
gal interpretations, criminal attacks and the 
hidden economy (HM Revenue & Customs 
2012, p.7).
Figure 1: The estimated tax gap in the UK for the years 2010
 
to 2011 in percent of the estimated theoretical tax revenue.
Source: HM Revenue & Customs (2012, p. 6).
The issue of tax compliance is complex, not 
least as numerous taxes and various kinds of 
taxpayers are involved. Economic studies of 
tax compliance predominantly investigate in - 
di vidual income taxes (Alm 2012, p. 53), which 
self-employed or workers whose income is 
not directly taxed at the source can evade 
by understating their true income. Further-
more, for income taxes there is the potential 
problem of overstated deductibles. Firms can 
evade taxes by not paying corporate income 
taxes; however, in such cases detection is like-
ly as companies are audited more frequently 
than individuals. Sales taxes, retail sales taxes, 
value-added taxes and property taxes in turn 
can be evaded by both, firms and individu-
als, but often require some kind of mutual 
agreement on tax evasion (Alm 2012). Over- 
Net tax gap:
6.7%
Tax receipts:
93.3%
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Figure 2: Estimated tax gaps in the UK.
 
all, this makes it difficult to assess the share of 
the different taxes in the overall tax gap and 
consequently publications on this matter 
are rare. So far, only the annual tax reports of 
Denmark and the UK break down the tax 
gap to the different taxes on a regular basis. 
Figure 2 shows the estimated shares of the UK 
tax gap for different types of taxes. Again, 
the tax gaps are defined as the amount of 
evaded and avoided tax. The largest tax gaps 
occur for the value added tax and the corpo-
ration tax.
 
Despite measurement difficulties tax compli-
ance appears to be an intensively researched 
field in economics, underlying its impor-
tance for policy. The relatively large body 
of literature on neoclassical models of tax 
compliance is surveyed by Andreoni et al. 
(1998). Recent literature applies findings from 
the emerging field of behavioural economics 
to tax compliance. Hashimzade et al. (2012) 
give a comprehensive account of behaviour-
al economic tax compliance models. The 
following sections build on this survey and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: HM Revenue & Customs (2012).
 
provide an introduction to the field, summar-
ising the measurement problems, traditional 
tax compliance models and then presenting 
literature on social interaction and tax com-
pliance. A particular focus in this literature 
survey is put on experimental studies on tax 
compliance, as these have the advantage of 
overcoming classical measurement prob-
lems, while being able to model economic 
incentives in a straightforward way. Doing 
so, this document focusses on tax compli-
ance of individuals, giving only a brief dis-
cussion of the topic of tax compliance by 
companies. In the end the survey also in-
cludes a short outlook of how policy makers 
can use existing research, for example by us-
ing moral suasion in tax collection. It also 
points to some topics for further research 
that may be particularly useful for practical 
application, including further cross-cultural 
studies, research on increasing compliance 
when widespread tax evasion is already prev-
alent, and more field experiments (hence 
research at the interplay of researchers and 
administrations).
Value Added Tax
(VAT)
Excise duties 
and other  
indirect taxes
Income Tax,  
National Insurance 
Contributions,  
Capital Gains Tax
Corporation Tax Other direct taxes Total tax gap
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Several articles (for example Slemrod and 
Yit zhaki 2002; Alm 2012; Slemrod and We-
ber 2012) discuss traditional and more recent 
approaches to measure tax evasion and its 
limitations. The central problem is that the 
criminal nature of tax evasion and threat of 
punishment cause cheaters to hide their ac-
tions. Therefore, tax evasion is generally not 
 
 
 
 
easily observable and hard to measure. Eco-
nomists have used a number of methods 
to circumvent this problem. Table 1 lists the 
most common approaches and summarises 
advantages and shortcomings. The first two 
methods measure tax evasion indirectly, the 
last four methods allow for a direct measure-
ment of tax evasion.
2. Measuring tax evasion
Method Advantages and disadvantages
Estimations using 
shadow economy 
data
Activity in the (unobserved) shadow economy are not taxed 
or regulated. Estimates of the size of the shadow economy 
can be used to calculate evaded taxes (Schneider 2005), for 
example using the currency demand approach. However, esti-
mations are likely to be unreliable because they use estimates 
of the unobserved factors which are hidden and therefore esti-
mations suffer from serious measurement problems. Another 
practical problem is the fact that these approaches assume the 
velocity of money to be constant (over time and between the 
official and the unofficial economy).
Consumption-
based estimations
The commonly observed overconsumption of self-employed 
individuals compared to employees can be used to estimate 
tax evasion. A classic example is included in Pissarides and 
Weber (1989) who use British food survey data. Recently, Arta-
vanis et al. (2012) used consumer loan data from a major Greek 
bank to estimate the households’ real income. The advantage 
of this method is that it uses observable factors which are very 
strongly correlated with true (but unobservable) income.
Table 1: Different methods to measure tax evasion.
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3. Levitt and List (2007) provide a general discussion on the validity 
of experimental methods in economic research.
Method Advantages and disadvantages
Surveys Surveys of tax morale and evasion frequently draw on data 
from the World Value Survey (WVS) or the European Value 
Survey (EVS) (e.g., Frey and Torgler 2007; Lago-Peñas and 
Lago-Peñas 2010). The EVS includes a question on people’s 
tendency to justify cheating on tax payments if they have the 
opportunity to do so. Self-reported tax morale is argued to be 
correlated with tax compliance. An advantage of survey data 
is its wide availability for many countries, allowing for cross-
cultural analyses. Furthermore, also inner-country analysis 
can be conducted if regional data is available (as in Feld and 
Larsen 2012). Drawbacks of studies using surveys are that self-
reported attitudes towards evasion might be biased as people 
may not report honestly on dishonest or illegal behaviour. 
Fur thermore, biases are potentially influenced by culture, 
rendering intercultural comparisons difficult.
Randomised  
tax audits
Randomised tax audits provide a more accurate and direct 
measure of individual compliance. They are, however, very 
costly and the data is only available for very few countries. 
Furthermore, even a thorough audit may not detect evasion 
with certainty. Evidence from the randomised audits is used 
for example in the study of Schneider (2005).
Lab experiments 3 Alm (2012) and Torgler (2002; 2007) discuss arguments in fa-
vour and against using laboratory experiments in research on 
tax compliance. Clear advantages are that compliance is di-
rectly measurable, institutional changes are easily testable, it 
is easier to investigate the causality of effects. Also cultural 
influences on tax compliance may be identified in cross-cul-
tural studies. On the other hand, the lacking realism of lab ex-
periments can be criticised (for example harsh punishment of
Table 1 (cont.)
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An example for a consumption-based esti-
mation approach for measuring the shadow 
economy and tax evasion is Artavanis et al. 
(2012). They use a dataset on credit recipients 
from a major Greek bank. The authors find 
a vast over-consumption of consumer loans 
in some occupations. The average self-em-
ployed borrower spends more than 80% of 
the declared monthly income on servicing 
their debt. Some professions spend even 
more than 100% of the declared monthly 
income on paying back their bank loans (Ar-
tavanis et al. 2012, p. 2). Following the bank’s 
common practice, the authors estimate the 
true income of self-employed individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The authors find that the average self-em-
ployed earned 1.92 times the income re-
ported to the tax authority. Consequently, 
the authors estimate the total tax loss from 
evasion of self-employed in Greece at EUR 
11.2 billion in 2009 (Artavanis et al. 2012, p. 
21). The strength of this study is surely the 
unique micro dataset, which accounts for 
numerous socio-economic variables on a 
household level and allows for precise esti-
mation of income tax evasion. However, the 
overall tax compliance even of the individu-
als investigated in this study, for example 
considering other taxes, is not accounted for.
Method Advantages and disadvantages
Lab experiments 
(cont.)
evasion like jail sentences and ostracism of evaders cannot be 
implemented in the lab) which can lead to reduced external 
validity. Furthermore, the use of student subjects, as common 
in experimental economic research, may be problematic be-
cause they have little experience with filing tax reports and 
have a higher education than the average taxpayer.
Field experiments Compared to laboratory experiments, field studies ensure a 
high external validity of the results. Like in laboratory experi-
ments, institutional changes can be implemented. A drawback 
to field experiments is that their implementation appears rela-
tively difficult, as they are costly and time consuming. For 
example, randomised audits can be used in order to make 
tax compliance measurable. However, the implementation of 
randomised audits can be very costly. Examples of field ex-
periments are Slemrod et al. (2001), Kleven et al. (2011).
Table 1 (cont.)
Variable Prediction
Audit probability Positive correlation with compliance: The higher audit prob-
ability decreases the expected payoff from tax evasion.
Table 2: Predictions of the Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model of tax compliance.
The influential article by Allingham and 
Sand mo (1972) introduces the most com-
monly used framework to analyse income 
tax evasion as a risky choice, drawing from 
the literature on economics of crime, as well 
as on optimal portfolio choice (Allingham 
and Sandmo 1972, p. 323). In the model it 
is assumed that taxpayers are homogeneous 
and act rationally, money maximising and 
selfish. Taxpayers can either choose a safe 
portfolio (truthfully declaring their gross 
income and paying the full tax liability), or 
a risky portfolio (evading taxes by under-
reporting their gross income). The taxpay-
ers’ income cannot be observed by the tax 
authority unless a tax audit is conducted. 
Yitzhaki (1974) introduces changes to the 
Allingham-Sandmo (A-S) model in order 
to make it more realistic. The penalty of an 
uncovered tax evader is now calculated as a 
share of the evaded tax, rather than a levy on 
undeclared income. The author argues that 
this is more in line with the American and 
Israeli tax systems (Yitzhaki 1974, p. 201).
The augmented framework allows for ana-
lysing the effects of changes in the probabil-
ity of being detected, the fine rate and the 
tax rate. Table 2 illustrates that a rising prob-
ability of being detected and an increasing 
fine rate reduce the expected payoff from 
evading taxes, and thus make cheating rela-
tively less attractive. For a change in the tax 
rate the predictions are somewhat counter-
intuitive, as a higher tax rate leads to higher 
tax compliance.
Additionally the standard A-S model has 
further been extended by including more re-
alistic elements; while keeping the rational 
expected-utility framework, for example an 
additional (potentially moral) cost of eva-
sion has been integrated in the framework. 
Andreoni et al. (1998) discusses some exten-
sions. Furthermore, also a dynamic version 
has been studied by Engel and Hines (1999).
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The benefits of the model are its straightfor-
ward assumptions and its relatively simple 
and clear predictions. However, the frame-
work also includes the usual limitations of 
economic models, which abstract from the 
complex reality that make tax compliance 
a difficult topic. For example, uncertain-
ties about the real probability of an audit 
or severe punishments, like imprisonment, 
are not included in the model. In a com-
prehensive survey Alm et al. (1992b) discuss 
both strengths of the standard A-S model as 
well as additional aspects to consider. Apart 
from this, the model has been criticised in 
several ways (Hashimzade et al. 2012, p. 2):
• Using realistic fine rates, tax rates, audit 
pro babilities and coefficients of risk aver-
sion, the model suggests complete tax 
evasion.
• Empirical studies have shown that tax eva-
sion increases with a rising tax rate, rather 
than fall (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002, p. 1441).
• The assumption that all income is self-re-
ported to the tax authority is not realistic. 
Firms often directly report their workers’ 
wages to the tax authority (Sandmo 2005, 
p. 646).
• The probability of facing an audit is not 
common knowledge, and ambiguity-averse 
taxpayers might overestimate the proba-
bility of an audit (Snow and Warren 2005, 
p. 869)
• The framework simplifies the behaviour 
of economic agents. It does not take psy-
chological effects and moral considera-
tion well into account (Bosco and Mit-
tone 1997, p. 299).
• It has been argued that the use of expected 
utility, exogenous income and labour sup-
Variable Prediction
Fine rate Positive correlation with compliance: the higher fine rate de-
creases the expected payoff from tax evasion.
Tax rate Positive correlation with compliance for the assumption of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion: for a taxpayer with decreas-
ing absolute risk aversion, a higher tax rate cuts the safe net 
income for the case of compliance. Thus, the taxpayer is less 
willing to take the risk and the tax compliance increases.
Gross income Negative correlation with compliance for the assumption of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Table 2 (cont.)
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ply, full information (e.g. absolute audit 
probability), and the framing as a ‘game 
against nature’ is unrealistic (Bosco and 
Mittone 1997 p. 299). The exclusion of im-
portant psychological effects, for example 
perceived injustice or inequality in the tax 
system, social norms, and public good 
implications, can be criticised.
Lastly, the taxpayers’ utility function used in 
the Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model is 
clearly based on wrong assumptions on the 
taxpayers’ preferences. It is assumed that tax-
payers gain utility only from private income 
which is decreased by their tax payments. Pri-
vate benefits from publicly provided goods 
and services are missing, rendering any pay-
ment to the government irrational. Contrast-
ing this assumption, taxpayers clearly ben-
efit from publicly provided streets, schools 
and healthcare systems which might provide 
a motive for paying taxes.
The previous section presented the neoclas-
sical account of taxation, which relies on the 
assumptions of expected utility theory. This 
part presents behavioural economic exten-
sions of the classical framework which in-
clude more realistic assumptions of taxpay-
ers’ behaviour. The survey by Hashmizade 
et al. (2012) gives a systematic account of the 
various behavioural economic concepts and 
their application to the field of tax compli-
ance. The authors divide literature in two 
types of approaches: models using non-ex-
pected utility theory and models incorpo-
rating social interaction into the traditional 
framework.
Non-expected utility theory In neoclassical 
economic models of tax evasion, the taxpay-
ers’ compliance decision is usually pictured 
as a choice under risk with known informa-
tion on the probability of being detected 
and fined. Non-expected utility theory can 
account for taxpayers who overweight the 
probability of being detected. Dhami and al-
Nowaihi (2007) present a framework of tax 
compliance which incorporates cumulative 
prospect theory. Therefore the model ac-
counts for people’s tendency to overweight 
small probabilities and the inclination use a 
reference income as orientation for decision 
making (loss aversion). The authors report 
that this model predicts levels of compliance 
which are closer to the actually observed 
compliance rates. Additionally, Hashmi-
zade et al. (2012) argue that the probability of 
 
 
 
 
being audited might not be obvious to the 
average taxpayer. Therefore, they make deci-
sions under ambiguity (uncertainty with un-
known probabilities) rather than under risk 
(uncertainty with known probabilities). The 
authors refer to the Ellsberg Paradox as an 
example for people’s tendency to avoid am-
biguity. Ambiguity-averse taxpayers might 
be more compliant if the tax authorities 
conceal specific information on audit proce-
dures and probabilities. Thus, Hashmizade 
et al. (2012, p. 23) conclude that models in-
cluding these phenomena can make more 
realistic predictions of the extent of evasion. 
Furthermore, heterogeneous compliance be-
haviours across taxpayers are accounted for, 
if the taxpayers’ probability weighting func-
tions differ. This means that in contrast to 
the standard A-S framework, a model with 
heterogeneous probability weighting func-
tions can account for differing compliance. 
However, it remains counter-intuitive also 
in these models that a rising tax rate is still 
associated with a reduction of evasion.
Social effects Models trying to incorpo-
rate social effects account for the fact that 
taxpayers’ decisions might be influenced by 
their specific social and cultural environ-
ments. They include factors like psychologi-
cal costs, prestige, fairness, social norms and 
group effects. The psychological costs con-
nected with tax evasion or financial costs 
other than the fine can be influential factor 
that deter people from cheating. For exam-
4. Behavioural economics models of taxation
4. Behavioural economics models of taxation 15
ple, psychological costs might arise because 
people fear to be detected or publically 
shamed (Hashmizade et al. 2012, p. 23-24). 
Hashmizade et al. (2012, p. 29) also highlight 
the influence of fairness on tax compliance: 
one can distinguish between two concepts 
of fairness: the fairness towards the govern-
ment and fairness towards other taxpayers. If 
government services and publicly provided 
goods are of poor quality, taxpayers might 
perceive tax payments as unfair. Similarly, 
if tax payments vary a lot from one taxpayer 
to another, people who are required to pay 
larger shares might perceive this as unfair. 
The authors conclude that models includ-
ing social effects can generally explain the 
empirical findings better than the standard 
model or non-expected utility models. They 
also argue that this shows the importance 
of social effects in the field of tax compli-
ance (Hashimzade et al. 2012, p. 32). The high 
compliance rate, individual heterogeneity 
and the reversed effect of the tax rate can be 
implemented in these models.
The previous section highlighted the behav-
ioural concepts on a theoretical level. This 
section turns to empirical evidence on the 
previously described effects gathered in the 
laboratory and the field. As the experimen-
tal literature on tax compliance is very ex-
tensive, no comprehensive literature review 
is provided. Instead, some studies are high-
lighted and those studies discussing the im-
portant issue of social effects are categorised 
at the end of the section.
Experiments have advantages compared to 
theoretical modelling, estimations and sur-
vey evidence. Alm (2012, p. 65) argues that 
experiments, compared to survey evidence, 
allow for a direct observation of decisions to 
evade. Theoretical models cannot include 
all important factors for the taxpayers’ de-
cision making without being too complex. 
Thus, experimental evidence can comple-
ment theoretical models. Furthermore, the 
effects of institutional changes as well as 
changes in the social environment can be 
tested. Field experiments yield an increased 
external validity of the results.
5.1 Measuring social effects:  
cooperation, social norms and fairness
Experimental research explores the role of 
social effects for individual decision mak-
ing in social dilemma situations. Findings 
suggest that, among others, reciprocity, fair-
ness and social norms potentially shape the 
outcome of decisions. Deciding whether or 
not to pay taxes represents a social dilemma 
where private and communal interests go 
against each other, as paying taxes is indi-
vidually costly but benefits society: taxation 
is strongly linked to the provision of public 
goods and services. Governments usually 
pro vide these goods for the general public 
because private individuals would not pro-
vide an efficient level of public goods. Taxes 
are necessary to finance the public provi-
sion of these goods and services. Therefore, 
it seems natural that tax compliance is af-
fected by the quality of publicly provided 
goods and services. Laboratory experiments 
have shown that a higher return from pub-
lic goods leads to increased tax compliance 
(Blackwell 2007). Social effects have been 
widely explored in the laboratory using pub-
lic good experiments. Tax compliance ex-
periments have tested and confirmed these 
effects. The findings of selected studies are 
presented below.
Reciprocity Chaudhuri (2011) argues that 
recent laboratory experiments analysing 
public good games could identify reciproc-
ity as an important driver of behaviour and 
conditional cooperation as a relatively sta-
ble type of social preferences. Condition-
ally cooperative individuals cooperate in 
case they expect their peers to cooperate. 
On the other hand, they do not cooperate if 
they expect others to be uncooperative. Of 
course, the decision in laboratory public
5. Experimental evidence
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Public good experiments
So called public good experiments are designed to recreate the social dilemma situ-
ation associated with a public good in the laboratory. Public goods are characterised 
by non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption. These features lead to under-
investment under private provision of public goods.
In a standard public good experiment (for a survey see for example Ledyard 1995; 
Chaudhuri 2011) an abstract situation of private public good provision is created. 
Participants are randomly allocated to groups of mostly four participants. Each par-
ticipant receives a monetary endowment and makes an investment decision: keeping 
the whole or parts of the endowment or contributing it to a public good. All contri-
butions to the public good are then (for example) doubled by the experimenter and 
equally split among all group members.
The social dilemma arises because the highest aggregated payoff can be achieved 
only if everyone contributes all the endowment to the public good. On the other 
hand, the individual payoff can be increased by keeping the endowment. Standard 
economic theory would predict free riding of all group members and therefore no 
contributions to the public good. In contrast, laboratory experiments find substan-
tial heterogeneity in levels of contributions and voluntary cooperation: relatively 
stable shares of individuals tend to free ride or cooperate conditionally on their 
peers’ behaviour, while others contribute at least conditionally (Fischbacher et al. 
2001).
Recently, costly peer punishment has been added to the standard game described 
above and has been shown to increase cooperation (Fehr and Gächter 2000). This 
framework was used to explore cultural differences in cooperation norms and en-
forcement (Herrmann et al. 2008; Gächter and Herrmann 2009). It has been shown 
that cooperation norms vary substantially with cultural environment. Initial con-
tributions and punishment behaviour of the participants in the public good games 
appeared very different across different countries. Interestingly, the norm of coop-
eration and norm enforcement was shown to be correlated with survey evidence on 
civic cooperation and the rule of law in the respective countries.
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good experiments differs from the taxpay-
ers decisions. The most striking difference is 
that paying taxes is required by law and eva-
sion is punishable, whereas contributions 
in the laboratory are voluntary and mostly 
anonymous. Nonetheless, taxes are usually 
used to provide public goods and one might 
presume that taxpayers act conditionally 
cooperative. This would mean that the 
voluntary compliance with tax regulations 
is higher for the case that taxpayers expect 
others to comply as well and try to engage in 
higher evasion activities if they expect oth-
ers to cheat.
Frey and Torgler (2007) confirm the rel-
evance of conditional cooperation for tax 
compliance. They use an empirical analy-
sis of the European Values Survey from the 
years 1999 and 2000 to explore conditional 
cooperation in the field of taxation. The au-
thors report a high correlation between tax 
morale (justifiability of tax evasion) and per-
ceived level of tax evasion. A drawback to 
the study is that it solely relies on self-report-
ed data from questionnaires and does not 
measure actual tax evasion. Furthermore, 
the direction of the effect (causality) is not 
entirely clear. Hence, more comprehensive 
studies might be needed. Bazart and Bonein 
(forthcoming) find evidence for reciprocal 
taxpayer behaviour in a laboratory experi-
ment. They report that participants tend to 
adjust their reported income according to 
the information about their peers behaviour 
which they gathered in the previous rounds.
Social norms Herrmann et al. (2008) con-
duct laboratory public good experiments 
with a second stage of costly punishment in 
sixteen different countries. The authors find 
varying punishment patterns across the dif-
ferent subject pools. Figure 3 illustrates the 
differences and shows for each subject pool 
the mean punishment of free riders (pro-so-
cial punishment) and the mean punishment 
of group members who contributed at least 
as much as the punisher (anti-social punish-
ment). The authors also report a connection 
between the level of anti-social punishment 
and the initial level of cooperation in the 
public good experiment. Herrmann et al. 
(2008 p. 1365-1366) highlight the influence 
of varying norms of civic cooperation and 
rule of law for the observed results. Using 
a regression analysis, the authors show that 
the respective country’s norms of civic co-
operation (extrapolated from the World 
Values Survey) and rule of law (taken from 
the World Bank Governance Indicators) are 
both positively correlated with anti-social 
punishment in the experiments.
Social norms may also influence the com-
pliance decisions of taxpayers. For example, 
Traxler (2010) develops theoretically how con-
ditionally cooperative taxpayers may condi
tion their decisions on the social norm of 
paying taxes. However, as shown by Wenzel 
(2004), the social norm of paying taxes can 
both increase and decrease payment behav-
iour of individuals depending on whether 
they feel belonging to a society (with a par-
ticular norm) or not. In another experiment 
Wenzel (2005) also shows that norm percep-
tion may play an important role and hence 
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Figure 3: Punishment patterns in different countries.
providing information on the norm may 
change behaviour. It has furthermore been 
shown that compliance norms may differ 
between cultures. Cummings et al. (2001) 
con duct laboratory experiments on tax com-
pliance in Botswana, South Africa and the 
United States. They argue that the difference 
in social norms might explain varying com-
pliance across the three countries because 
the experiment and procedures are the same 
in the three countries. The authors also con-
trol for differences in the risk attitude that 
might explain differences in compliance in 
the laboratory experiment. In a further study 
also Bobek et al. (2007) compare tax com-
pliance norms between different countries.
Source: Herrmann et al. (2008, p. 1363).
Fairness The issue of fairness is likely to 
play a role for tax compliance of individuals. 
Kirchler et al. (2008, p. 219) argue that hereby 
one has to distinguish three dimensions: re-
distribution, procedures and sanctions. The 
first refers to the perceived tax burden of a 
taxpayers compared to their peers. The sec-
ond aspect deals with how the tax authority 
treats the taxpayers. The latter refers to the 
treatment and sanctioning of cheaters. Frey 
and Torgler (2007) show that a higher insti-
tutional quality is associated with higher tax 
compliance. Taxpayers might be motivated 
to pay their fair share of taxes to fund an ef-
ficient government. Feld and Frey (2002) ar-
gue that trust and respectful treatment of the 
taxpayers is connected to tax compliance.
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5.2 The cross-cultural perspective:  
differences across Europe
As argued above, social effects influence de-
cision making. Social effects tend to differ 
from one country to another. Thus, differ-
ences in culture and social attitudes across 
countries may help to explain differing lev-
els of compliance. Unfortunately, few stud-
ies take a cross-cultural perspective on tax 
compliance.
Barr and Serra (2010) report the findings from 
a laboratory bribery game conducted in the 
UK with students from 34 different coun-
tries. The authors report that for undergrad-
uate students, the behaviour of individuals 
in the experiment can be predicted by the 
corruption levels in their countries of origin. 
The authors argue that these findings show a 
large influence of cultural environment and 
social norms for behaviour and highlight 
the cultural aspect of corruptive behaviour. 
They also find that graduate students who 
have been living in the UK for longer than 
the undergraduates adapt their behaviour 
such that corruption levels in their country 
of origin cannot proxy the behaviour any 
more. The authors argue that during the 
time in the UK students may have adopted 
the domestic set of values. Similar cultur-
al effects might influence individuals’ tax 
compliance.
5.3 Group identity: patriotism, conflicts 
and fiscal propaganda
As discussed in the previous sections, social 
effects influence tax compliance. These ef-
fects might be more pronounced for mem-
bers of a certain peer group. Konrad and 
Qari (2012) find a strong link between patri-
otism and tax compliance using an empiri-
cal analysis of data taken from the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme. The survey 
includes questions on whether one perceives 
tax evasion as legitimate, which serves as a 
proxy for tax compliance. The authors ag-
gregate several questions on national pride 
to a patriotism variable and report a signifi-
cant positive correlation between patriotism 
and tax compliance.
Slemrod (2007) discusses the impact of na-
tionalism on taxation. The author points 
out that appealing to patriotism has been 
used during wartimes to finance armed con-
flicts, for example, the United States Secre-
tary of Treasury during the First Wold War 
who described the goal of these measures as 
‘capitalizing patriotism’ (Slemrod 2007, p. 
40). Therefore, the norm to pay taxes seems 
to be subject to big variations and largely de-
pendent on their context: during a conflict, 
a norm of increased tax compliance seems 
to emerge due to increased patriotism. As 
mentioned before, governments might of 
course try to promote patriotism and com-
pliance in such situations.
The implications of conflicts have also been 
studied in the laboratory. Abbink et al. 
(2010) extend classical individual contest 
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games by introducing a group contest game 
with punishment opportunities of non-con-
tributors. They find high levels of inefficient 
investments into a group contest if non-con-
tributors can be punished compared to an 
individual contest game. Additionally, inef-
ficient investments in group contests with 
punishment exceed that of group contests 
without punishment, which are in turn 
higher than investments in individual con-
test games. The authors argue that these 
findings might shed light on conflicts be-
tween political groups: groups of people 
(even consisting of anonymous individuals 
randomly allocated in the lab) are prepared 
to overinvest in rivalries (Abbink et al. 2010 
p. 438). These findings might be connected 
to people’s increased contributions to con-
flicts through war bonds and voluntary tax 
compliance. Furthermore, also the studies 
by Wenzel (2004, 2005) as discussed above 
shed light on the issue of group identity.
5.4 Laboratory experiments
As described above, economic experiments 
have been argued to be especially suitable to 
explore the field of tax compliance. Hence, 
non-surprisingly the experimental literature 
in the field of tax compliance has been in-
creasing in recent years. This subsection sums 
up the latest advancements in this field.
The standard framework of a laboratory ex-
periment on tax compliance and enforce-
ment (Blackwell 2007; Alm 2012) can be 
de scribed as follows. Participants receive or 
earn an income and are asked to declare this 
income to a tax authority. There is, however, 
no automatic test whether the declaration 
made is correct. Participants pay taxes on the 
declared income and face a certain probab-
il ity of an audit. When audited, taxes on 
unde clared income and a fine have to be 
paid. This standard framework can be eas-
ily altered to test theoretical frameworks, 
explore the effect of institutional changes, 
or develop new interventions to increase 
compliance.
The Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model of 
tax compliance, introduced above, makes a 
counter intuitive prediction on how a rising 
tax rate would affect compliance. Experi-
ments were used to investigate this issue. 
Blackwell (2007) conducts a meta-analysis of 
twenty laboratory experiments, which were 
carried out between 1987 and 2006. The ag-
gregated data is used to test the influence of a 
change in the tax rate, the fine rate, the prob-
ability of an audit and the per capita return of 
a public good on tax evasion. For all but the 
tax rate, the author reports a significant posi-
tive effect on tax compliance. Thus, the find-
ing on the effect of a rising tax rate contra-
dicts the initial prediction of the A-S model.
Alm (2012) as well as Alm and Jacobson (2007) 
provide detailed surveys of experiments on 
tax compliance. The work in this field can 
be roughly divided into four types of studies:
1. Testing theory: Fines and audit probabili-
ties do not change much in reality. How-
ever, people’s reaction to changes can be 
explored with experiments. Alm (2012, 
p. 66) and Blackwell (2007) show that 
higher tax rates might lead to less compli-
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ance (mixed evidence), while higher audit 
probabilities lead to more compliance.
2. Testing biases in individual decision making: 
Taxpayers tend to overweight the prob-
ability of an audit (Alm 2012, p. 66).
3. Testing the scope of social influences: Public 
goods, fairness, social norms, reputation 
or public shame may influence decisions. 
A higher marginal per capita return of a 
tax-financed public good leads to more 
compliance (Blackwell 2007), publicly an-
nouncing the result of an audit can act 
as an additional punishment (Alm 2012, 
p. 66) and individual as well as group re-
wards in case the audit indicates full com-
pliance can increase compliance (Alm 
2012, p. 66).
4. Developing and testing new measures: Audit 
selection rules (e.g. probability depends 
on the deviation from median reported 
income).
The standard framework of laboratory ex-
periments widely used to explore taxpayers’ 
compliance decisions, however, also has two 
central shortcomings. Numerous experi-
ments neglect the positive returns as well as 
positive externalities of paying taxes which 
naturally occur through the public provi-
sion of goods and services. The aspect that 
taxpayers receive a return on their payments 
was shown to increase tax compliance in lab-
oratory experiments (e.g. Alm et al. 1992a).
Furthermore, Kirchler et al. (2008) describe 
the ‘slippery slope’ framework of tax com-
pliance as an insightful way to bring to-
gether the evidence gathered in numerous 
experimental studies. The authors argue that 
compliance depends on the power of the au-
thorities and the trust in authorities (Kirch ler 
et al. 2008, p. 211). One extreme case of where 
the ‘slippery slope’ can lead to is described 
as the ‘cops and robbers’ scenario, where 
the tax authority sees the taxpayers as cheat-
ers who would try to evade if they can. The 
taxpayer would feel distrust towards the au-
thority and evade whenever it pays off to do 
so. The opposite is called ‘service and client’ 
approach, where the taxpayers feel it is their 
duty to pay taxes and perceive the authority 
as a service provider to society (p. 211). The 
authors suggest that the situation might be 
different across countries and is typically lo-
cated between these two extremes. This ap-
proach also allows for a cross-cultural com-
parison of the interaction between the social 
norms of tax compliance and tax collecting 
and spending institutions. The framework 
appears particularly interesting for policy 
makers, as it can be used to derive policy rec-
ommendations depending on the prevail ing 
norms and social environment.
5.5 Field experiments
As mentioned earlier, field experiments pro-
mise a high external validity of the results 
because they take place in a natural setting 
where subjects are not necessarily informed 
about participating. This natural environ-
ment of tax compliance cannot possibly be 
modelled by laboratory experiments. On 
the other hand, similar restrictions like those 
for observational studies apply. For exam-
ple, the reliable measurement of tax compli-
ance is difficult and costly. This might be a 
reason for field experiments in tax compli-
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ance being rare. However, some studies exist 
and further are currently being carried out. 
This sub-section presents evidence from 
four recent field experiments investigating 
tax compliance.
Slemrod et al. (2001) describe one of the first 
field experiments in tax compliance. The 
authors explore the effect of differences in 
perceived audit rates by sending a letter to a 
group of taxpayers in Minnesota. The letter 
announced a close examination of the tax 
report which the respective taxpayers were 
about to file. The tax payments were com-
pared with that of a control group which 
consisted of taxpayers who did not receive 
a letter. The authors report that the effect 
of the letter varies with opportunities to 
evade as well as with income. Low and mid-
dle income groups raised their amount of 
reported income compared to the control 
group whereas the high income group did 
not. The authors report a number of draw-
backs to their experimental design such as 
the relatively small size of the treatment 
group with 1724 taxpayers and the lack of 
measuring differences in real evasion and 
avoidance rather than reported income.
Kleven et al. (2011) conduct a large scale 
field experiment in Denmark to test the ef-
fect of audits and threat-of-audit letters on 
individual income tax compliance, using 
a representative stratified sample of 42800 
taxpayers. The authors argue that their ex-
periment allow them to test the predictions 
of an augmented classical tax compliance 
model including third party reporting. The 
authors argue that this model predicts the 
findings of their experimental study reason-
ably well. The treatments were conducted 
in two stages. In the first year, half of the 
sample was randomly selected for an unan-
nounced tax audit. In the second year, tax-
payers from both groups were randomly al-
located to three treatment groups. The first 
received a threat-of-audit letter stating that 
everyone in this group will be audited, the 
second group received a letter announcing 
random audits to half of the group and the 
third group did not receive any letter. An 
interesting approach of the study is to com-
pare compliance of people subject to third-
party reporting and that of self-reporting 
taxpayers. The authors argue that most tax-
payers are subject to third-party reporting 
and thus might comply with tax regulations 
because they do not have the possibility to 
evade taxes. The authors report widespread 
tax evasion among self-employed, but near-
ly no evasion for taxpayers subject to third-
party reporting. Additionally, they find a 
small marginal effect of tax rate on evasion 
for self-employed. Furthermore, they report 
that previous audits and threat-of-audit let-
ters have a significant effect on self-reported 
income.
Torgler (2012) explores the influence of moral 
appeals on tax compliance in a field experi-
ment using a sample of 578 taxpayers from 
Switzerland. Half of the sample was ran-
domly selected to receive the standard tax 
form followed by a letter highlighting the 
moral obligation to pay taxes. It is reported 
that the letter has a positive effect on tax 
compliance, although it is not significant. 
The author points out that using a sample 
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of taxpayers from a small commune might 
bias the effect of moral suasion upwards. 
Therefore, the author concludes that the in-
fluence of the messages on tax compliance 
is very limited.
Hallsworth et al. (forthcoming) look at the 
propensity of taxpayers to pay their out-
standing taxes and how norm and fairness 
messages affect payments. The authors argue 
that the decision to pay taxes is the second 
stage of tax compliance which has been sig-
nificantly less explored than the first stage, 
the declaration decision (Hallsworth et al. 
forthcoming, p. 5). Another beneficial as-
pect appears to be that in contrast to tax eva-
sion, the payment of outstanding tax debts 
is easily and directly observable. Hallsworth 
et al. (forthcoming) describe two large scale 
field experiments in the UK conducted in 
2011 and 2012 using a subject pool of more 
than 100000 individuals in each of the ex-
periments. In the first experiment, the au-
thors test two fairness and three normative 
messages which are added to the standard re-
minder letter for late payment of taxes. The 
authors report the largest effect for a norma-
tive message (‘Nine out of ten people in the 
UK pay their tax on time. You are currently 
in the very small minority of people who 
have not paid us yet.’). People in this treat-
ment group were 5.1% more likely to make a 
payment towards their debts within 23 days 
after receiving the reminder letter compared 
to the control group (Hallsworth et al. forth-
coming, p. 16). The second experiment is 
implemented the same way and tests for the 
psychological distance of normative messages 
as well as the effect of descriptive and in-
junctive norms. General descriptive norms 
were shown to have a larger effect compared 
to general injunctive norms. The psycholog-
ical distance or the normative messages was 
varied by describing the behaviour of others 
in the same region (‘The great majority of 
people in your local area pay their taxes on 
time.’) or in a similar situation (‘Most peo-
ple with a debt like yours have paid it by 
now.’). More specific norms were shown to 
have a larger effect. The authors argue that 
because including normative messages in 
the reminder letters is relatively cheap, also 
small effects can be cost effective.
Another interesting study has been con-
ducted by Gangl et al. (2013), in which not 
individual tax payers have been subject to 
a field experiment, but companies. More 
specifically, in this study small enterprises 
in Austria were randomly selected and con-
tacted by a tax auditor. The companies were 
(relatively) small, began their operations in 
2011 and were active in sectors deemed to be 
prone to tax non-compliance. Companies 
in the treatment group were approached by 
a ‘friendly’ tax auditor and closely audited 
throughout the year. The control group was 
neither approached nor audited closely. The 
study shows two main results: one is that 
audits reduced the willingness to pay taxes 
on time, potentially crowding out other mo-
tivations to pay. They did, however, reduce 
the amount due after the official payment 
date, indicating a two-way effect of the pol-
icy.
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6. Firms: corporate income tax 
 
and third party reporting
As described above, most literature in the 
field of tax compliance focusses on declara-
tion of individual income and payment of 
individual income tax. The literature on tax 
compliance of firms is, however, relatively 
small. There are several reasons for this. One 
is based on the fact that the main effect of be-
havioural economics can be found in fields 
where economic and non-economic factors 
(psychology, morality) interplay. However, 
this non-economic element is assumed away 
for companies, unless the company or en-
trepreneur is essentially composed of an in-
dividual. However, such small (or medium) 
entrepreneurs again behave similarly to nor-
mal (self-declaring) taxpayers. For example, 
Hibbs and Piculescu (2010) point out that 
compared to individuals, firms are not influ-
enced by social effects like guilt or shame. 
However, the authors present a model of tax 
evasion on the firm level that can explain the 
frequently observed different levels of eva-
sion in the same institutional environment. 
The authors argue that depending on the 
perceived usefulness and quality of goods 
and services provided by the government, 
the firms will tolerate taxes. The perception 
might vary across firms and therefore firms 
might differ in their tax compliance. Never-
theless, empirical evidence on this reason-
ing is not available.
The other element is the purely economic 
side of tax evasion. Although tax audits are 
much more common for companies than 
for individuals, it might hence be profitable 
for companies to evade taxes. However, the 
problem here is that evasion would have to 
be carried out by individuals in the com-
pany; but this activity is not contractible 
between the owners of  a company and its 
managers or other subordinates. For exam-
ple, Kleven et al. (2009) describe a model of 
third party reporting of taxable income. The 
authors argue that for firms with a large num-
ber of employees cheating is not profitable 
even for a low probability of an audit and 
low fines. This might be due to the threat of 
whistleblowers in the company. Therefore, 
it is difficult for companies to evade taxes, 
which is illegal activity. Companies can, 
how ever, try to reduce the taxes paid within 
the legal framework–but this activity is tax 
avoidance, not tax evasion. How tax avoid-
ance could be addressed is not the focus 
here, although solutions may be found in 
behavioural economic approaches. The rea-
son for this is that there is almost no litera-
ture available on this topic.
It hence remains to investigate the behav-
iour of small companies who may act simi-
lar to self-employed individuals. However, 
these are already embraced by much of the 
research on ‘voluntary’ tax payments dis-
cussed in the preceding sections.
The text introduced the latest evidence from 
studies exploring the field of tax compliance 
with behavioural economic and experimen-
tal methods. After presenting the problem 
of measuring tax evasion and non-compli-
ant behaviour, different approaches to cir-
cumvent measurement problems were high-
lighted. Next, neoclassical economic models 
of tax compliance with their strengths and 
weaknesses were presented. The extension of 
the classical model by behavioural economic 
elements was mentioned, that is, mainly 
non-expected utility theory moral consid-
erations and social effects. Furthermore, re-
cent empirical evidence from experimental 
economic research was discussed. Much of 
this empirical literature is based on ques-
tionnaire-based observational as well as on 
experimental studies. Many of these studies 
investigated the impact of factors such as 
norms, fairness or peer pressure, indicating 
that may have a significant influence on tax 
compliance by individual tax payers.
Additional insights may also be gained by 
considering cultural effects, which could be 
driving differences of compliance levels be-
tween countries. For example, experiments 
on tax compliance can be used to test theo-
retical models and novel institutions, but 
also for measuring cross-cultural differences.
Summarising main results of the research 
surveyed here, the literature has identified 
behavioural economic tools that influence 
 
 
 
 
compliance. These translate into the follow-
ing promising approaches which tax author-
ities might adopt to boost voluntary com-
pliance:
• Signing honour codes and tax self-reports 
at the beginning, before filling in the de-
tails to trigger more compliant behaviour. 
It was argued that this reminds people of 
their moral concepts and self-perception 
as an honest and law-abiding citizen (Shu 
et al. 2012).
• Higher institutional quality is associated 
with an increased intrinsic motivation to 
pay taxes (Frey and Torgler 2007).
• Trust in governments and tax authorities 
can help to maintain a high level of com-
pliance (Torgler 2003).
• Promoting social norms on tax compli-
ance can be vital.
• A shift from an enforcement oriented tax 
authority to a more service oriented ap-
proach, providing information and assis-
tance to taxpayers can increase tax com-
pliance (Traxler 2010).
• Cultural effects should be taken into ac-
count when shaping policy measures to 
boost tax compliance.
After discussing potential positive influences 
of social effects on tax compliance and po-
tential intervention to benefit tax compli-
ance, a caveat connected to tax compliance 
should be addressed as well. Torgler et al. 
(2003, p. 376) discuss the effects of tax am-
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nesties which are in place in many European 
countries. The authors conduct laboratory 
experiments in Costa Rica and Switzerland 
and find that regular amnesties decrease tax 
compliance in the long run. It is argued that 
amnesties can decrease the government’s 
credibility and the taxpayers’ intrinsic moti-
vation to comply. Still, systematic evidence 
on the effects is still missing. One can argue 
that if tax amnesties reveal that a high share 
of people evaded taxes, norms of voluntary 
compliance can be affected. This is especial-
ly the case for conditionally cooperative tax-
payers whose compliance decision depends 
on the actions of other taxpayers. Further-
more, compliant taxpayers might perceive 
their tax burden as unfair compared to oth-
ers if they learn that evasion is prevalent. 
Alm et al. (1990) conduct a laboratory ex-
periment on tax amnesties and come to a 
similar conclusion. The perceived fairness 
of the amnesties plays a big role; only well 
designed tax amnesties accompanied with 
higher enforcement might not impact gen-
eral tax compliance. Another paper showing 
that not all behavioural economic policies 
promote tax payments in the long terms is 
Coricelli et al. (forthcoming). Here the au-
thors show that putting individuals into a 
shameful situation after being caught evad-
ing taxes has a detrimental effect if shaming 
persists for several rounds.
Taking together results presented in this 
survey, the general statement is hence that 
behavioural economic factors can signifi-
cantly influence tax compliance, and if well 
applied, usually cause an increase in com-
pliance. However, there does not appear to 
be a uniform, one-size-fits-all approach of 
using insights from behavioural economics. 
Besides this very broad and general conclu-
sion, what can be gained for policy-makers 
and where would more (applied) research 
provide most promising additional insights?
For policy-makers and administrations such 
recommendations could include:
• Consider the use of moral suasion in tax 
collection efforts if the number of non-
com pliers is originally low in the popula-
tion.
• Use the potential overestimation of indi-
viduals to be audited or the willingness of 
people to participate in lotteries.
• Also consider that culture is an important 
factor and that good government, that is, 
the public benefit character of the state is 
a main motivator for tax compliance.
• Use behavioural economic measures with 
caution, and pre-test them (including a 
scientific evaluation) in the field.
The following elements seem of particular 
relevance (again from the demand side of tax 
administration and policy-makers) for the 
research we intend to conduct in this area:
• While cross-cultural effects appear very 
like ly to exist in the area of tax compliance 
(transferring from more general insights 
gained through economic experiments) 
further studies with similar or the same 
de sign across cultures could prove to be 
very fruitful.
• Most research has been conducted in coun-
tries and experimental frameworks where 
tax compliance is relatively high. It would 
be interesting to also understand the effects 
of behavioural economic policies when 
tax compliance is originally low in a cul-
ture (or in an experiment).
• The effects of peer feedback, for example 
when auditing particular groups of tax-
payers, appear interesting and practically 
highly relevant.
• More field experiments are warranted to 
increase the external validity of existing 
research.
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